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Abstract: An extensive literature concerned with optimal depletion of an
exhaustible resource, with only a few exceptions, ignores the economy-wide and
sectoral distribution effects of resource depletion. This paper presents a dynamic
computable general equilibrium model to link the underlying natural resource
base to economic performance. The model consists of an intra-temporal price
endogenous model of a market economy, embedded in an inter-temporal optimal
growth and development model. It is an optimization model that determines the
optimal development path of the economy, hence, the inter-temporal depletion
problem subject to workings of a multi-sector market economy. This general
equilibrium approach captures the economy-wide and sectoral distribution effects
of resource depletion. The model, benchmarked to Iranian data, is used to
examine the issues related to optimal extraction of an exhaustible resource,
optimal savings in the economy, and the allocation of investment funds.
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1 Introduction
An extensive literature concerned with optimal depletion of an exhaustible
resource, with only a few exceptions, ignores the economy-wide and sectoral
distribution effects of resource depletion. Typically, capital accumulation and
consumption are discussed within the limited framework of the one-sector
neoclassical growth models (Aarrestad 1978). These models do not consider the
role of prices in influencing production and consumption decisions of firms and
households, and undermine the significance of inter-sectoral interaction on the
optimal depletion profile. The treatment of the optimal depletion of an
exhaustible resource independently from the rest of the economy is only justified
when perfect capital markets prevail.1 Clearly, in the case of oil exporting
developing countries where well functioning capital markets do not exist, the rate
of resource depletion is closely related to activities in the rest of the economy. In
any realistic circumstance, therefore, the intensity of interaction among various
sectors and markets across the economy has significant bearing on the depletion
program, as does the level of domestic and international prices. Private and
public consumption and savings decisions as well as the investment allocation
mechanism of a country directly affect its level of resource extraction. In these
instances a general equilibrium approach that fully captures the economy-wide
effects of resource depletion is the appropriate tool.
This paper presents a dynamic computable general equilibrium model to link a
country’s underlying natural resource base to its economic performance. The model
consists of an intra-temporal price endogenous multisectoral model of a market economy,
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embedded in an inter-temporal optimal growth and development model. This general
equilibrium approach captures the economy-wide and sectoral distribution effects of
resource depletion. The model is benchmarked to Iranian data and is used to examine the
issues related to optimal extraction of an exhaustible resource, optimal savings in the
economy, and the allocation of investment funds. Our interest is with general
equilibrium effects of oil extraction and investment policies within a window of time
during which the oil reserves abound and the oil sector plays a crucial role in the
economy. Hence, the issues related to full depletion of oil and transition to a non-oil era
are not considered in this study.2
Devarajan (1988) reviews the CGE applications to natural resources and taxation
issues in developing countries and identifies three categories of models:
1- "Energy Management Models" that generally focus on energy-economy
interactions3;
2- "Dutch Disease Models" that study the effects of an export boom on the rest of
the economy; and
3- "Optimal Depletion Models" that take into account the exhaustibility of the
resource and establish optimal extraction of the resource in a multisectoral
context.
Devarajan (1988) sketches out the formal structure of the last two classes of models and
presents some results from the application of these models. The model to be proposed
here belongs to the optimal depletion category of computable general equilibrium
models. It is an optimization model that determines the optimal development path of the
economy, hence, an inter-temporal depletion problem subject to the workings of a multisector market economy. Such a formulation establishes general equilibrium linkages
3

between the depletion profile of the resource and the rest of the economy working
through both factor and product markets. The main focus is on the optimal rate of
exhaustible resource depletion.
Section 2 presents the overall theoretical structure of the model by
discussing the nature of the economic institutions or "actors" in the economy and
the ways in which they interact. The following section presents the equations of
the dynamic model and discusses in detail the objective function and the two
important intertemporal linkages in this model: depletion of the exhaustible
resource oil, and optimal savings and investment allocation. A full description of
the equations of the static sub-model are in Section 4. In section 5 implementation
of the model and some simulation results are described. A summary and
conclusions are presented in the last section.
2 Structure of the Model
The four major actors in the economy are producers, households, government,
and rest of the world. Figure 1 depicts an economy-wide circular flow of income and
provides an overall picture of links among actors in the economy. Note that the model
ignores the monetary side of the economy; the capital market or the financial sector acts
only as a "savings pool", where all savings in the economy are collected and are
channeled to real investment expenditure.4 The following sections provide a detailed
discussion of the main institutions of the economy and conclude with an overview of how
the major dynamic choices of government regarding resource depletion and investment
are addressed in the model.
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Figure 1: Major actors in the economy and circular flow of income

2-1 Producers
Producers are industries or sectors of production of the economy. Each sector is
assumed to behave as a single representative firm producing a single homogeneous good.
There are four sectors in the economy, of which one extracts the non-renewable resource
of oil. This sector is called the "oil sector" and the remaining sectors -- agriculture,
industry and service -- will sometimes be referred to as "non-oil sectors". The outputs of
producers may be consumed domestically, used as material inputs (intermediate inputs)
in the production of other goods, or exported.
There are three primary factors in the economy: man-made capital or "capital" for
short, a natural capital or "resource", and labor. Households own capital in non-oil
sectors and also their labor; government owns both physical and natural capital in the oil
sector. All sectors employ capital, labor, and intermediate inputs in their production
processes. It is assumed that intermediate inputs are demanded in fixed proportions to
the level of gross output while the production technology for the primary factors is
described by a neoclassical constant returns to scale production function. The oil sector
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also is assumed to have a fixed coefficient demand for intermediate inputs and employs
physical capital along with labor to extract the exhaustible resource oil.
All non-oil sectors are assumed to maximize short run profits. Given wage rates
and rentals on capital, they decide on the input factor levels that maximize their profits.
The oil sector is also assumed to behave as a short run profit maximizer in its labor hiring
but the capital requirements of the sector are determined by the government (issues
related to the oil sector will be discussed later in more detail). Aggregation of factor
demands across sectors determines the total demand for primary and intermediate inputs.
Supplies of goods and services, given the availability of factors, are determined by the
production technology of the firms.
As shown in Figure 1, producers make payments for their primary inputs to the
owners of factors. They also pay other production sectors for using their products as
intermediate inputs. Other outlays of the producers include depreciation expenditures,
which go to the total savings pool, and indirect taxes, which are collected by the
government. Producers receive payments from the households, the government, and the
rest of the world when they purchase goods and services in the product market. Inflow of
funds from the savings pool augments the production capacity of the firms for future
production.
2-2 Households
There is a single representative household in the economy that owns the capital in
the non-oil sectors, and labor. This household, as illustrated in Figure 1, supplies factor
services and receives payments made for them.
The household provides a fixed amount of labor, assumed to be an aggregation of
various skill categories, and receives factor payments for labor. Competitive short run
profit-maximizing behavior assures that the nominal wage rate equals the value of the
marginal product of labor. The household is also owner of the man-made capital in the
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non-oil sectors and receives payments made to this capital. There exist potential factor
market distortions in the economy, so wage rates and capital returns may vary across
sectors.
The household can either save or consume its income. The consumption of the
household, however, follows a fixed pattern, that is, the household spends a fixed portion
of its income on the goods of each sector. In other words, the sectoral private
consumption shares are constant. This specification is a simplified version of a linear
expenditure system and implies unitary income and price elasticities of demand. These
assumptions may be too restrictive for the long term, where the share of total
consumption expended on certain goods might change in the course of development.
However, we retain this simple demand structure to avoid excessive complexity.
2-3 The Rest of the World (ROW)
The rest of the world is linked to the model through exports, and imports. The
model constructed in this study uses an intermediate specification of foreign trade that
has become standard practice in nearly all developing country CGE models, namely
Armington (1969). This approach treats domestically produced goods and imported
goods as imperfect substitutes. In other words, consumers can choose between imports
and domestic goods that are not identical. The price of domestic products can deviate
from that of the imported products to the extent that the users do not find them
substitutable. Analogously, imperfect transformability is assumed on the export side.
This specification allows divergence between domestic price of exports and their world
prices.
Crude oil is by far the largest component of foreign trade in oil exporting
countries, hence, changes in the world prices of oil have significant implications for the
domestic economy. The model retains the small open economy assumption, indicating
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that the economy is a price taker in the international markets. That is, the world prices of
both exports and imports are exogenous to the model.
Capital flows in the form of investing abroad or foreign borrowing are other
important links between an open economy and the rest of the world. As labor abundant
oil exporting countries do not consider investing in foreign assets as a viable investment
alternative,5 the model assumes that foreign savings is a fixed proportion of the GDP.
The assumption of fixed foreign savings, in addition to ruling out investing abroad,
implies that the country cannot borrow and must rely on its domestic resources to expand
its production capacity. Clearly this has strong implications for the depletion of oil and
will be discussed later.

2-4 The Government
The government plays a central role in the economy. The aim of the present
study is to describe the optimal actions of the government. Notwithstanding its pivotal
role, the government does not work within the environment of a command economy. It
strives to achieve societal objectives within the more realistic environment of a mixed
economy in which market also plays an important role. Thus, the government is an
optimizing agent that faces the institutional constraints posed by the workings of a
market economy, where producers and households independently pursue profit or utility
maximization.
The government is assumed to be a benevolent selfless entity that is motivated
solely by social welfare.6 The optimizing producers and households through the price
mechanism establish a one-period equilibrium, or more precisely, a sequence of one
period equilibria. The government, on the other hand, with information on current and
future prices determines the long-run dynamic behavior of the economy by maximizing
an inter-temporal social welfare function subject to the total availability of the
exhaustible resource, adjustment costs in the accumulation of capital, and constraints
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implied by the set of competitive within-period equilibria. The government with perfect
foresight determines the private savings rate and the rate of investment in the oil sector to
maximize social welfare. This social welfare is represented in the objective function of
the model as the present value of a representative household’s utility of consumption,
plus the present value of the terminal capital stock and the resource remaining in the
ground.
The government's behavior is constrained by yearly balanced budgets. That is,
the government revenues are either saved or consumed; hence, there is no possibility of
government budget deficit or surplus. The government's total expenditures include
purchases of goods and services from producing sectors on a fixed share basis. The net
savings of the government is the residual of its revenues less its expenditures.7 The
government expenditures are viewed as administrative input required for running the
overall economy but are not valued in the objective function. However this does not
mean that the government services have no effect on social welfare. On the contrary, the
government by producing services such as health and education improves and increases
factor productivity, hence, significantly affects the production.
As shown in Figure 1, the government earns its revenues through direct and
indirect taxes, tariffs, and revenues from the oil sector. Tax and tariff rates are assumed
to be exogenous and fixed over time -- we could vary these rates but we chose to focus
on the oil sector as the major constraint of development policy. Oil revenues are the total
revenues of the oil sector (value added plus the user charge or the rent for the resource)
less the wage bill.

2-5 Choices of Government
The core of government's decisions, and the focus of this study, are the
fundamental dynamic choices of oil economies, namely: optimal rate of depletion of oil,
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optimal level of investment and investment allocation. The instruments that the
government uses to address these issues are further discussed below.
Oil Depletion
The government as the owner of both physical and natural capital in the oil sector
receives returns from these factors. Oil revenues are the major source of government
revenues and significantly affect activities in the rest of the economy. Given domestic
prices, world prices of both imports and exports, and international trade elasticities, the
government, as the owner of the oil resource, at the intra-temporal level manages the oil
sector as a short-run profit maximizing firm. At the inter-temporal level, however, the
government determines the magnitude of the physical capital in the oil sector, hence, the
rate of resource extraction.
The oil sector's labor demand is determined by the assumption of competitive and
short run profit maximization behavior of the sector in the labor market. This assumption
is plausible for the following reasons. First, the wage rate in the economy is determined
by the market mechanism and the government is a price taker in the labor market.
Second, the share of labor in oil production, compared to the contribution of physical
capital, is very small; thus, the effect of any alternative assumption about labor is
inconsequential.8 Finally, the assumption of profit maximization implies an efficient
management of the sector in its day to day activities, which is consistent with the long
run goal of the government. It is possible to drop the assumption of the competitive and
profit maximizing behavior in the labor market and let both factors of production -capital and labor -- be determined by the government. This would only have a minor
effect on the production level and the interpretation might be more difficult.
Savings and Investment Allocation
The government influences household saving decisions through its tax policies
and other instruments, which are not explicitly modeled. In other words, economy-wide
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savings is determined by the government's choice of the rate of private savings as it
optimizes a social welfare function. Total savings includes government savings. The
base model assumes that government consumption is a fixed portion of its revenues and
government savings is found as a residual. This assumption is consistent with the
experience of developing countries generally and oil economies in particular. Of course,
in reality the public sector does not shrink when oil revenues decline, but this is not a
concern here. Other formulations of government consumption-savings decision are
possible. The level of government savings, for example, can be linked to GDP or oil
revenues.
A variation of the base model, which in its objective function values government
consumption along with private consumption, is used to find optimal government
savings. By controlling the economy's savings level, the government indirectly
determines the optimal level of all the activities in the economy, including the level of oil
extraction, subject to workings of a competitive economy.
Once the savings level is determined the next question is how investment funds
are allocated among sectors. The government concerned with long run social welfare
decides the investment share of the oil sector. The remainder of the investment fund is
distributed among non-oil sectors. This residual investment is allocated such that the
more productive and profitable sectors of the economy receive a larger share. An
alternative to the present formulation is one in which the government determines the
investment shares for all sectors. This formulation would imply a much larger role for
the government in the economy. Clearly, the greater command of the government would
result in a different optimal path for the economy, including a different oil depletion path.
Another approach to investment allocation is to introduce perfect foresight for individual
firms. Each firm would make its investment decisions to maximize its net present worth.
This approach to dynamic behavior of producers is more recent and less widely adopted
in multisectoral models.9
11

3 The Dynamics of the Model
3-1 The Objective Function
In our model, we maximize the welfare of the representative household, which
includes the present value of the utility of consumption over time and the present value of
end-of-planning-horizon capital stock and oil reserves:
⎡
⎤
MAX J = ∫ U (Ct ) * e+t dt + ⎢ PK * ∑ K i ,T + PR * RSRV (T ) ⎥ * e−∆T
i
⎣
⎦
Here, (Ct) represents Cobb-Douglas aggregation of consumption of CDi,t of goods from
sector i in time period t with fixed consumption shares chi :
Ct = CD1cht 1 * CD2cht 2 ..... CDntchn

n

where

∑ ch

i

=1

i=1

and PK is the price of terminal capital stock; PR is the price of resource at terminal
period; and ∆ is the social discount rate. The utility function is concave, reflecting the
diminishing marginal utility of consumption. In other words, as the society gets richer
the value of an additional unit of consumption declines. The general form of the utility
function is U ( c ) =

1
c 1− Φ with Φ ≠ 1, where a higher constant elasticity of marginal
1− Φ

utility (Φ) implies a higher degree of consumption smoothing over time. The positive
social discount rate (∆) implies that when faced with the choice between a unit of
consumption today or the same unit tomorrow, the society chooses the first option.
The statement of our problem, with the objective function written in a discrete
form, is summarized as:
(1) Objective function
12

T

1
1
*
*
MAX J = ∑
t
(1 − Φ )
t = 0 (1 + ∆ )

LM∏ cCD
N

i ,t

i

h OPQ

1− Φ

chi

+

LM
N

1
* PK * ∑ Ki ,T + PR * RSRV ( T )
(1 + ∆ ) T
i

OP
Q

Subject to: equations 2-47, to be described in the following sections.
3-2 Optimal Depletion of Oil

The major focus of this study is characterizing the extraction path for an
exhaustible resource in a multisectoral framework. The optimal path is identified for a
given planning period during which the economy enjoys substantial oil reserves. Our
interest is with the economy-wide effects of oil extraction; namely: the optimal
intertemporal pattern of extraction constrained by workings of a market economy, the
optimal intertemporal pattern of accumulating physical capital, and the allocation of
investment funds. This model is designed to focus on a period that oil reserves abound
and the oil sector plays a crucial role in the economy. There are, however, a number of
important questions that can only be addressed using a more general model which is
capable of explicitly dealing with the full exhaustion of oil reserves and transition to a
non-oil era. Such a model would place the depletion problem in a broader context and
can be used to address the issues related to the transition period.
The oil sector differs significantly from other sectors in that it uses a resource that
is nonrenewable and is owned by the government. There are a number of issues that are
exclusive to the oil sector. Therefore, we describe our theoretical treatment of the oil
sector, and the ways in which this model departs from conventional models of
exhaustible resources.
An exhaustible resource is different from other goods and resources in that it is
limited in quantity and cannot be reproduced. By consuming a unit of resource today we
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forego a value that might have been realized in the future. In the case of an exhaustible
resource, the normal efficiency condition of a competitive economy, where price is
equated with marginal cost of production, does not hold. Instead, the price exceeds the
marginal extraction cost by an unobservable amount called economic rent.10 Theories of
optimal depletion of exhaustible resources attempt to describe the behavior of this rent
over time. Optimal depletion, as the term is commonly used in the literature, means the
pattern of depletion that maximizes the present value of the resource’s net benefits
stream.
In a classic work, Hotelling (1931) demonstrated that in a competitive economy
the price of an exhaustible resource, net of its marginal cost of extraction, must grow at a
rate equal to the rate of interest. For the monopolist, he showed, the net marginal
revenue, not the net price, will grow at the interest rate.11 Hotelling derived these results
assuming constant marginal extraction costs, although he was aware of the effects of
cumulative production (Devarajan and Fisher 1982). This assumption implies that the
extraction costs are independent of the remaining stock of resource or that the resource is
of a constant quality. But as originally suggested by Ricardo (1817), deposits of
exhaustible resources, just like land, occur in varying grades and the higher qualities (i.e.,
the lower-cost) are exploited first.12 Therefore, it is more realistic to assume that the cost
of extraction is negatively related to the stock of resource, that is, it gets more costly to
extract as the stock dwindles.13
The specification of the oil sector in our model assumes that the extraction cost is
a function of stock size and rises as the stock is depleted. We further assume a known
extractable quantity of reserves, that no exploration activity takes place, and that there is

14

no uncertainty.14 The present model differs significantly from the conventional single
sector partial equilibrium models of exhaustible resource extraction in that it
characterizes a depletion profile within the constraints imposed by the workings of a
market economy. The level of activities in the non-oil sectors, domestic and world
prices, and the behavior of various autonomous economic actors have direct bearing on
the extraction plan.
For the purpose of exposition let us use a continuous time version of the optimal
control framework to cast the optimization problem of the oil sector in the same way that
is typically done in single sector partial equilibrium models. This exposition helps to
highlight some of the notable similarities and differences that exists between the
conventional partial equilibrium models of exhaustible resources and the formulation of
the resource depletion in this model (a multisectoral general equilibrium framework).
The optimization problem of the oil sector in a partial equilibrium model of
exhaustible resource can be viewed as selecting an extraction program {XDt, t=1, 2,...} to
maximize the present value of a stream of benefits. In symbol the problem is:
M AX
{X D t }

∫ {P
T

0

* X D t − c ( X D t , S t )} * e − rt d t

s.t.
T

∫ X D d t ≤ S (0 )
t

0

where c(.) is the extraction cost function and is negatively related to stock size, that is
∂c
∂S

< 0 . If we write the original quantity of oil as S(0) = S0 and the stock left at the

last period as S(T) = ST, the constraint can be rewritten as:
•

S t = − XDt
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This constraint (equation of motion), similarly, in our general equilibrium framework
captures the dynamic updating of the oil reserves; it enters in discrete form, as shown
below, into the computer program that solves the model:
(2) Oil reserve updating
St +1 = St − XD' oil' ,t

Note that the optimization problem, described in the previous section, in our general
equilibrium model is much broader than intertemporal profit maximization of a single
sector. Also note that in our model the economy in addition to resource availability
constraint faces numerous other constraints; notably, it incorporates imperfections in
capital markets.
The Hamiltonian for the above problem is:
H = P * XDt − c ( XDt , St ) − ω * XDt

where in the language of optimal control theory ω is the costate variable (the shadow
price of oil), XD is the control variable, and S is the state variable. The first two terms in
the Hamiltonian measure net current benefit and the last term is the future losses due to
not having the resource. The Hamiltonian is maximized along an extraction program
such that at the margin the net benefit from extracting a unit is equal to the loss of that
unit from the stock of resource.
The necessary conditions are:

∂H
=0
∂ XDt
•
∂H
(b)
= − ω +r * ω t
∂S
•
∂H
(c)
= St
∂ω

⇒ P-

(a)

∂c

− ωt = 0

∂ XD t
•

⇒ r *ωt = ω −
•

⇒ − XDt = S
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∂c
∂ St

The first condition of optimal depletion says that, along the optimal path, the price of
resource P is equal to the marginal cost of extraction

∂c
∂ XD

plus the shadow price of

resource (rent) ω. The condition (b) is a description of the behavior of the rent over time.
With the assumption that the extraction costs are negatively related to the remaining
•

ω
stock this condition implies that the rate of change in the rent, , is less than the interest
ω
rate r.15 The third condition is just a restatement of the constraint.
The explicit functional form of the cost function, c(XD, S), depends on the
technology and can be derived by solving the following minimization problem:16
c ( XDt , St ) = min W * F
s. t.
XD = f ( L , K ; S ) = A( S ) * Lα * K 1−α
where W is the vector of factor prices and F is the vector of factors. The explicit
functional form of f(L, K; S) in our model is the production function for the oil sector that
will be discussed in detail later.
It must be recognized, however, that there are fundamental differences between
the assumptions about the economy in the control problem of an exhaustible resource and
the CGE model presented in this study. First, the capital is sector specific and perfectly
immobile in the CGE model, but it is perfectly mobile in the control model. Second, the
CGE model assumes a diminishing marginal efficiency of investment and incorporates
costs of adjustment for capital stock. This is incompatible with the factor market
assumptions in the control model, which assumes that capital services are perfectly
malleable, i.e., any amount of capital can be rented at the given market interest rate.
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Third, an important feature of the CGE model is that it solves for market clearing
equilibrium prices, but in the control model the price is exogenous.
3-3 Savings and Investment Allocation

One important feature of the present model is its explicit treatment of the dynamic
inter-period market equilibrium. The government chooses the private marginal
propensity to save (MPS) and the rate of investment in the oil sector (ISHR'oil') so as to
maximize the social welfare function as represented in equation (1). The non-oil sectors
receive the remainder of investment funds based on their relative profitability in past and
current periods. This specification of investment allocation assumes that non-oil sectors
have myopic expectations (Dervis et al. 1982). Specifically, each non-oil sector's share
of investment funds, ISHRin, is equal to its share in aggregate capital income, SPin,
adjusted upward if the sector's profit rate is higher than the average profit rate and
adjusted downward otherwise:
(3) Investment shares in non-oil sectors

ISHRin,t +1 = SPin,t + Ω * SPin,t *

LM RP − AVGRP OP
N AVGRP Q
in ,t

where RPin is the sectoral profit rate, AVGRP is the average profit rate for the economy
as a whole, and Ω is an investment mobility parameter, a measure of the responsiveness
of capital markets to sectoral profit rates.17 The following three equations show how
profit shares, SPin, profit rate, RPin, and average profit rate, AVGRP, are determined.
Note that the profit rate, RPin includes Rin, rate of return on capital as well as capital
gains (di is the sectoral depreciation rate).
(4) Share in overall profits
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SPin = Rin * Kin

∑R

jn

* K jn

jn

(5) Determination of profit rates
RPin,t +1 = Rin,t +1 + PKin,t +1 − (1 + din ) * PKin,t

PKin,t

(6) economy wide profit rate
AVGRP =

LM∑ RP * K OP
N
Q
in

in

∑K

in

in

in

The investment funds in each sector augment the sector's capital stock but at a
decreasing rate as shown below:
(7) Dynamic capital equation

K i ,t +1

−2
⎡ ⎡
DK i ,t ⎤ ⎤
= K i ,t * (1 − d i ) + θ i * K i ,t ⎢1 − ⎢1 +
⎥ ⎥
⎢ ⎢⎣ 2 * θ i * K i ,t ⎥⎦ ⎥
⎣
⎦

where θ is the investment cost adjustment coefficient. This specification embodies an
absorptive capacity constraint, i.e. the marginal efficiency of sectoral investment declines
if investment grows too rapidly.18 As the rate of investment,

DK
, rises, the return to
K

additional DK declines. Technically, with such an absorptive capacity constraint, the rate
of increase in capital stock, K, would be smaller than the rate of increase in investment as
a percentage of capital stock, DK/K.
4 The Static Model

The static portion of the model is a multisectoral general equilibrium model of a
Walrasian competitive economy. Apart from the peculiar effects of dynamics of the oil
sector, the static model shares many of the features of the family of CGE models
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constructed for developing countries by Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982)19 -- such
as imperfect substitution in trade and imperfections in factor markets.
An overall schematic view of the major components of the model is depicted in
Figure 2. The figure includes factors, products rates, and prices as well as the various
functional forms that link the parts together.
K
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Figure 2. Factors, Prices, and Products in the CGE

Factors & Products:
K:
man-made capital
L:
labor
RS: natural capital (resource)
V:
value added
N:
intermediate inputs
XD: domestic output
E:
exports
XXD: domestic sales of domestic goods
M: imports
X:
composite good

Rates & Prices
R:
rate of return on capital
WA: wage rate
ω:
shadow price of resource
PV: value added price
PN: price of intermediates (incl. tax)
PX: average sales (output) price
PE: domestic price of exports
PD: domestic prices
PM: domestic price of imports
P:
price of composite good

4-1 Production and Factor Markets

The gross output of non-oil sectors is related to inputs according to a CobbDouglas production function in the following general form:

(8) Production function for non-oil sectors
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XDin = ad in * Lin α in * K in 1−α in

where the index "in" refers to non-oil sectors. Parameters adin and αin are constants and
reflect the production technology. In addition to labor and capital, intermediate inputs
are also required to produce each sector's output. This amounts to a two level production
where at one level capital and labor produce the real value added which in the next level
combines with intermediate inputs according to fixed input-output coefficients to produce
output (see Figure 2).
With labor and physical capital as the primary inputs, the production technology
is a constant-returns-to-scale technology. In this specification of technology the number
of firms in the sector does not matter and the whole sector can be seen as a single large
firm that takes output and input prices as given.
The production specification for the oil sector is different. The oil produced over
the years is ultimately going to be limited by total recoverable reserves. Oil is an
exhaustible resource and its cost of production depends crucially on the stock of reserves.
The smaller the remaining stock the larger is the cost of extracting a unit. The production
function in the oil sector also has a Cobb-Douglas functional form with constant-returnsto-scale and capital and labor as inputs:
(9) Production function for oil sector
XD' oil' = A( S ) * L' oil' α' oil' * K' oil' 1−α' oil'

where XD, L, and K are output, labor input and capital stock respectively; constant
parameter α is the labor share in output. The scale factor A(S) depends on S, the total
stock of resource remaining in the ground at each period. Therefore, A(S), decreases over
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time as the stock of oil is depleted, reflecting the increase in marginal cost of extraction
as seen in the cost function. Specifically, we assume:

A( S ) = S Σ * Z
where Z is a positive constant parameter reflecting the technology and Σ is the stock
elasticity of resource output.
There are some limitations to the use of Cobb-Douglas production function for
the oil sector that must be mentioned. Under this functional form for any strictly positive
stock of resource and physical capital, and any strictly positive wage rate and oil price,
there exists a profitable, strictly positive extraction level. In other word, with a CobbDouglas function it is not profitable to leave any oil in the ground; abandonment of oil
extraction is not possible. The reason is that the marginal product of labor rises toward
infinity as labor approaches zero (see the necessary conditions for equation 11). Since
we are sure that there exists a positive amount of physical capital in the sector (in form of
oil rigs), therefore, as long as there is a positive amount of resource in the ground it is
profitable to continue to extract. Not being able to abandon the oil production poses no
problem in this model since we are looking at a window of time where we always have
positive oil reserves and expect oil production to be profitable. Impossibility of
abandonment would be a problem in a context where it is optimal to leave positive
reserves in the ground as extraction costs become too high.
The amount of capital in each sector, K, is assumed to be fixed within each
period. This implies that current investments will add to capacity only in future periods.
Capital is a composite good assumed to consist of fixed proportions of different
investment goods. These proportions are summarized in the capital composition matrix,
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where an element bij is the amount of capital good originating from sector "i" that will be
used to make up one unit of real capital in sector "j". The parameters "ad" and "z" reflect
technological progress in each sector and are constant within a period. A Leontief inputoutput technology is assumed for intermediate inputs which implies such inputs are
demanded in fixed proportion to the level of output.
Competitive profit-maximizing behavior in all sectors implies that in each sector
the value of the marginal product of each factor must equal its price. Thus, total factor
payments in each sector are equal to the total value added by that sector. The (physical)
marginal product of labor for each sector is simply the derivative of its production
function (equations 8 and 9) with respect to labor. Before we can find the (money)
values of these marginal products we need to define net price or value added price. The
value added price, PV, is the price that producers use to make their output level and
factor demand decisions and is defined as the value of output at producer's price minus
the cost of the composite intermediate input. Sectoral value added price is given by:
(10) Definition of value added prices
n

PVi = PX i (1 − tni ) − ∑ Pj * a ji
j =1

where: PVi: value added price for sector i; PDi: domestic price of sector i's output; tni:
indirect tax rate; Pi: price of composite good; aij: input-output coefficients.
Profits are then the difference between revenues (output at value-added prices,
which excludes the cost of intermediate inputs) and capital and labor costs. Thus, the
profit maximization conditions that wages equal the value of the marginal product of
labor for both oil and non-oil sectors can be written as:
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(11) Labor demand function
WA * wd i * Li = XD i * PVi * α i

where WA is the economy-wide average wage rate of labor and wd is a wage distortion
parameter that measures the extent to which sectoral wage rate, WAS, deviates from the
average, WA. Note that this formulation permits labor market distortions, which are
measured by parameter wd, wdi=WASi/WA, and which is normally fixed over time.
The return to capital in each sector is found as the residual of value added net of
payments made to labor. The sectoral capital demands are determined by the following
equation:
(12) Capital demand function
Ri * K i = XDin * PVin − WA * wdi * Li

where R is the rate of return on capital.
4-2 Income Generation and Product Markets

The demand side of the economy consists of four basic blocks: consumption,
government, investment, and intermediate demand.
1- Consumption Demand
A single representative household in the economy owns the capital in the non-oil
sectors as well as the total supply of labor in the economy, and receives payments made
to these factors. Thus household income is total value added less the sum of depreciation
expenditures, DEPR, and the total payments made to physical and natural capital in the
oil sector, OILREV:
(13) Household income

Y = ∑ PVi * XDi − DEPR − OILREV
i
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The household saves a portion of its disposable income (total income less direct taxes,
DIRTAX) and spends the remainder. Household saving is given below in which MPS is
the household's marginal propensity to save and is determined through optimizing a
social welfare function, as discussed in Section 3-2.
(14) Household savings
HHSAV = MPS * ( Y − DIRTAX )

The single household is assumed to have a fixed structure of consumption where it
purchases products of various sectors by a fixed expenditure share. This demand
specification is a variation of Stone's linear expenditure system and is derived from a
Cobb Douglas utility function to be discussed later. The fixed consumption shares imply
unitary income and price elasticities:
(15) Household consumption behavior
CDi = chi * ((1 − MPS ) * Y − DIRTAX ) Pi
where CDi is total consumption demand for output of sector i; and chi is fixed
consumption share.
2- Government Demand
The sources of government revenue include direct and indirect taxes, tariff, and
the revenues from the oil sector, OILREV. The government revenue GR is specified by
the following budget equations:
(16) Government revenue
GR = DIRTAX + INDTAX + TARIFF + OILREV
(17) Direct taxes
DIRTAX = td * Y
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(18) Indirect taxes on domestic production

INDTAX = ∑ tni * PDi * XDi
i

(19) Tariff revenues
TARIFF = ∑ tmi * Mi * PWMi * ER
(20) Oil revenues
OILREV = XD' oil' * PV' oil' − WA * wd' oil' * L' oil' − DEPRO
where td and tni are direct and indirect tax rates, ER is the exchange rate between US
dollars and the Iranian Rials, tmi is the sectoral tariff rate, and DEPRO is the depreciation
expenditure in the oil sector.
Government, analogous to households, is assumed to have a fixed expenditure
structure such that it purchases goods and services in fixed proportions, cgi:
(21) Government expenditure pattern
GDi = cgi * GR Pi
where GDi is the government's demand for the output of sector i. Government savings,
GSAV, is found as a residual;
(22) Government savings
GSAV = GR − ∑ Pi * GDi
i

3- Investment Demand
We assume that the level of investment demand is determined by the level of total
savings available to the economy. Total savings includes private and government
savings, depreciation, and foreign savings;
(23) Total savings
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SAVINGS = HHSAV + GSAV + DEPR + FSAV * ER
Foreign savings, FSAV, is given by:
(24) Foreign savings
FSAV * ER = Ψ * ∑ PVi * XDi
i

where Ψ is the share of capital account in GDP. The sum of depreciation expenditures
contributes to total investment in the next period;
(25) Total depreciation expenses
DEPRt +1 = ∑ d i * PK i,t * K i,t +1
i

where di is the given rate of depreciation in sector i, PKi is the price of a unit of capital
employed in sector i defined as:
(26) Definition of capital goods prices
PK i = ∑ Pj * b ji
j

and bij is an element of the capital coefficient matrix and represents the amount of capital
good originating from sector i that will be used to make up one unit of real capital used in
sector j.
The inventory investment in each sector, IVi, is assumed to be a fixed proportion,
riv, of the sector's output (in the base run sectoral inventory investments for all periods
are assumed to be constant and equal to their base year value in real terms). Sectoral
productive investments are determined assuming that investable funds available to sector
i is a given proportion, ISHRi, of total productive investment which is total savings less
total inventory investment, TOTIV.
(27) Sectoral inventory investment
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IVi = rivi * XDi
(28) Total inventory investment
TOTIV = ∑ IVi * Pi
(29) Investment by sector of destination (oil sector)
DK ''oil ' = ( ISHR'oil ' *( SAVINGS − TOTIV )) / PK'oil '

(30) Investment by sector of destination (non-oil sectors)
DKin = ( ISHRin *( SAVINGS − TOTIV − DK'oil ' * PK'oil )) / PKin

In equations (29) and (30) DKi is the volume of investment by sector of destination and
ISHRi is the sector share of investment. The investment share for the oil sector ISHR'oil
is optimally determined, as explained in Section 3, and the non-oil investment
proportions are in a way measures of profitability of each sector and their determination
was also explained in Section 3. Notice that DKi is investment "to" sector i but we are
interested in finding investment demand "from" sector i. This is referred to as
"investment by the sector of origin", IDi, and it is determined using the capital
composition matrix, bij;
(31) Investment by sector of origin
IDi = ∑ bij * DK j
j

4- Intermediate demand
As a result of the fixed coefficients assumption, intermediate demand is derived
as follows:
(32) Intermediate demand
INTi = ∑ a ji * XD j
j
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4-3 Foreign Trade

Products of sectors are either internationally traded or nontraded. Traded sectors
are those that have either imports or exports or both. We start with the discussion of
imports but before doing that a word on notation is in order. In the following equations
the index "it" identifies traded sectors, while the index "itn" refers to non-traded sectors.
The union of subsets "it" and "itn" is "i" the set of all sectors. The index "in", as before,
identifies non-oil sectors.
Imports

Imports are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for domestically produced goods.
Following Armington's formulation we define a composite commodity, X, to be a CES
aggregation of the imported goods, M, and the domestically produced goods, XXD (the
relationships between X, XD, XXD, M, and E are shown schematically in Figure 2). The
aggregation function is:
(33) Composite good aggregation for traded sectors
X it = acit * δ it * M it− ρit + (1 − δ it ) * XXDit− ρit

− ρ1

it

where acit is a shift parameter; δit, is the share of imported good in the composite
commodity; and ρit, the function's exponent parameter is related to the trade substitution
elasticity σ by the expression: σit=1/1+ρit. The trade elasticity of substitution, σ, is a
measure of the ease with which domestic product and imports can be substituted for each
other. If no substitution is possible (σ=0), then composite good aggregation takes place
with fixed proportions and relative price changes cannot directly affect the demand for
imports. If, on the other hand, domestic product and imports are perfect substitutes
(σ=∞) the price ratio is the same for all ratios of imports to domestic products. So the
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greater the substitution elasticity the easier it is to substitute the two goods. We use
values of the elasticity of substitution greater than zero and less than infinity so that a
finite variation in the ratio of price results in a finite variation in M/XXD ratio. Clearly,
for sectors such as agriculture σ is large, whereas for capital goods it is quite low.
The CES formulation implies that consumers will choose a mix of domestic
goods, XXD, and imported goods, M, on the basis of their relative prices. Consumers are
assumed to minimize the cost of obtaining a "unit of utility":
(34) Value of domestic sales
Pit * X it = PDit * XXDit + PMit * M it
subject to (33). The solution to this problem yields the ratio:
(35) FOC for composite good
σ it

⎡ PDit ⎤
⎡ δ it ⎤
M it
=⎢
⎥ *⎢
⎥
XXDit ⎣ PM it ⎦
⎣1 − δ it ⎦

σ it

where P is the price of the composite good X, PD and PM are the prices, in domestic
currency, of domestic and imported goods respectively. With this specification PD is
determined endogenously and is no longer equal to PM, which is fixed exogenously and
is linked to the world price PWM by:
(36) Definition of domestic import price
PM it = PWM it * ER * (1 + tmit )

For sectors with no imports the composite good is equal to domestic sales of
domestically produced goods XXD:.
(37) Composite good aggregation for sectors with no imports
X itn = XXDitn
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Exports

Similarly, on the export side we allow the domestic prices to diverge from the
world price by utilizing product differentiation concepts. Specifically, a Constant
Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function allocates domestic output, XD, between
domestic use, XXD, and exports, E20:
(38) CET function
XDit = atit γ it * Eitφit + (1 − γ it ) * XXDitφit

1

φit

where atit is a shift parameter; γit is the share of exports in domestic output; and the
exponent θit is related to ϕ the elasticity of transformation by the expression ϕ=1/φ-1.
Producers can either export or sell in the domestic market. Their problem is to maximize
revenue from a given level of output subject to the CET transformation function.
(39) Value of domestic output
PX it * XDit = PDit * XXDit + PEit * Eit

The first-order condition represents export supply and is a function of the relative export
price to domestic price, the elasticity of transformation between the two uses and the
share parameters in the CET function.
(40) Export supply for traded sectors
1

⎡ PE 1 − γ it ⎤ φit −1
Eit = XXDit ⎢ it *
⎥
γ it ⎦
⎣ PDit
Note that implicit assumption in this specification is that there is always a positive
amount of export for any positive world price of export. In other words, each traded
sector always exports at least some of its output, thus a complete discontinuation of
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exports is not possible. Therefore, if one wanted to incorporate the possibility of full
depletion of oil reserves, hence zero oil exports, one must drop CET formulation in favor
of a more suitable specification.
For sectors with no exports domestic supply XD is equal to domestic sales XXD:
(41) Domestic sales for non-traded sectors
XDitn = XXDitn

The world market price of exports PWEit is linked to domestic price PDit by teit
the fixed export duty and ER, the foreign exchange rate.
(42) Definition of domestic export prices
PWEit * ER = PDit * (1 + teit )

Notice that the underlying assumption here is that all export demand is for domestically
produced goods rather than for the composite commodity. Put differently, exports are
netted out of domestically produced commodities, XD, before the remainder, XXD, plus
imports, M, produce the composite domestically traded good, X.
4-4 Market Equilibrium

We have established thus far the dependence of the different components of
demand and supply on commodity and factor prices. The equilibrium condition in the
product market is given by equation (43). The supply side consists of a composite good,
X, which is an aggregation of imports and the portion of domestically produced good that

is not exported, XXD. The demand side includes: demand for private consumption (CD),
demand for public consumption (GD), investment (ID), inventory demand (IV), and
finally demand for intermediate inputs (INT).
(43) Product market equilibrium
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X i = CDi + GDi + IDi + IVi + INTi

Total labor supply grows at a constant rate, Γ; it is also assumed that the labor
market clears. These conditions are shown in the following two equations:
(44) Labor supply updating
LSt +1 = LSt * (1 + Γ )
(45) Labor market equilibrium
LS = ∑ Li
i

Finally the current account balance defines foreign savings as the difference between the
values of imports and exports, or:
(46) Current account balance

∑ PWM

i

* M i = ∑ PWE i * Ei + FSAV

Walras' law states that the sum of the nominal values of excess demands of all
product and factor markets must equal zero. However, in this model, the system of
equations for intra-temporal equilibrium are not independent and thus not sufficient to
determine the unknowns. Since all demand and supply functions in the model are
homogenous of degree zero in all prices and the wage rate we can specify an additional
constraint. This constraint defines the numeraire price index and will not affect any real
magnitude in the system.
(47) Definition of market price index
P = ∑ Pi * λ i
i

where P is price index and λs are weights in the price index.
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5- The Model Implementation and Simulation Results

The model was applied to a data set of the Iranian economy, including a social
accounting matrix. The model was implemented in GAMS and used to conduct a number
of simulation experiments. The model accurately reproduced the base year data for the
Iranian economy and projected the optimal path of the economy for a 20 year period.
The next section contains a general overview of the base run simulation and run
results related to the optimal depletion of the exhaustible resource and the optimal
savings in the economy.
5-1 The Base Run Results

The numerical solution of the base model accurately reproduces the benchmark
1984 data of the Iranian economy. It also projects the values of all endogenous variables
over the planning period. The model was solved for 12 periods where each period is 2
years.21 Thus, not counting the last 2 periods,22 our “planning” period covers 20 years
from 1984 to 2004. The base run assumes constant world prices and that base-year
policies are maintained. The base run is used as a reference against which all subsequent
comparative dynamic experiments are compared.
The base model abstracts from an infinite horizon formulation assuming a finite
horizon and introducing a salvage value for terminal capital stock and the reserves of oil
remaining in the ground. There is no hard rule as to what constitutes an appropriate
choice for the salvage value except that the dynamic path of the economy implied by the
model should be "reasonable" and not at odds with historical experience. In the base run
the time path of the private savings rate served as the main indicator of the reasonability
of the salvage value.23 The private savings rate for the Iranian economy was 21.7 percent
in 1984 (the base year of the model) which is low compared to average savings rate in
other developing countries. Considering the desirability of achieving higher savings, we
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chose our salvage values such that the saving rate smoothly increased in immediate years
following the base year and stayed within an acceptable range throughout the planning
period.
5-2. Optimal Depletion Profile

This section analyzes the optimal time path of resource extraction. It discusses
the optimal depletion profile in terms of the objective function, model constraints, and
government instruments. The discussion compares some of the features of our general
equilibrium model to those of a traditional partial equilibrium model of exhaustible
resources. The sensitivity of the extraction path to model parameters is also discussed.
Figure 3 shows the optimal time path of oil extraction. This path represents the
optimal extraction path subject to the constraints of a market economy. The underlying
assumption of partial equilibrium models of resource extraction is that activities in the
resource sector have no effect on the rest of the economy, and that other parts of the
economy do not feedback to the resource market. Our general equilibrium approach,
however, recognizes the full range of interactions between the resource sector and the
rest of the economy.
The monotonically rising extraction level has an annual average growth rate of
7%. This growth rate initially rises from 5.6% to 6.8%, stays near 7% for a number of
periods, and slightly rises again toward the end. During the 19 year period starting with
1955, upon restoration of oil production to its pre-oil-nationalization level, and ending
with 1974, the peak production year, oil production in Iran grew on average at a rate of
16% annually. The rate of oil depletion suggested by the model for the 20 years of
planning period is significantly lower than the pre-revolution rate but higher than the
4.6% growth rate envisaged in the post-revolution development plan for 1989-1993.
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Figure 3. Oil Extraction Profile

The base run extraction program depletes 31% of total reserves by the end of
planning period. The depletion program indicates that oil extraction per capita is
growing at an annual average rate of 5.5% and oil revenue per capita is growing at a
slightly lower rate (5.4%).
Sensitivity of Depletion Profile
The optimal depletion profile is determined by the particular specification of the
terminal conditions, the structure and constraints of the model, and the choice of
government instruments. There are two features of the terminal conditions that can
significantly affect the depletion path. First, the model does not impose complete
exhaustion by the end of the planning period.24 A common feature of the early studies of
exhaustible resources, as in the analysis of Hotelling, is that the mine or well is
completely exhausted, even when the cost of extraction depends on cumulative output.
Levhari and Liviatan (1977) in an important paper extended the Hotelling's fundamental
findings to cover more general cases. They argue that the assumption that the output of
the mine or well is zero at terminal point is unnecessarily restrictive, and show that
terminal output may well be positive. Furthermore, these authors demonstrate that under
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more realistic assumption of incomplete exhaustion and with increasing extraction costs
it is possible to reach a point where extraction is not economical. Hence, production may
stop before complete physical exhaustion occurs. Generally, theoretical research on
exhaustible resource has shown that when the effects of cumulative extraction are added
to a Hotelling model one should not expect standard results; see, for example, Schulze
(1975), Pindyck (1978) and Fisher (1981). More importantly, one must bear in mind that
when an optimal depletion model is embedded in a general equilibrium model the
standard Hotelling model does not apply; see Aarrestad (1978).
Our empirical results clearly substantiate another claim of Levhari and Liviatan,
that it is possible to have monotonically rising extraction path. The intuition behind this
is that with the cost of extraction rising as reserves fall, there is an incentive to postpone
the production for later periods. Because reducing production during the early stages of
extraction induces a benefit in the form of lower extraction costs for every period into the
future. This benefit, however, declines over time and the end result is a monotonically
rising depletion path.
The second important feature of terminal conditions is that the salvage value
directly determines the outcome of the model. The scrap term in the objective function
consists of salvage values of physical capital stock and unexploited reserves of oil in the
terminal period. The values are exogenous to the model and are chosen such that
reasonable paths for the economy emerge. The depletion path depicted in Figure 3 is one
among various paths that could be generated. An indication of the robustness of this
depletion path is that changing the salvage value only changes the end point of the
depletion path and not its shape. Experiments with the model also show that the
valuation of man-made and natural capital relative to one another has more significant
effects on the depletion profile than a change in the salvage value.
A distinguishing feature of the general equilibrium model in this study is that the
oil sector is not isolated from the rest of the economy. The oil sector, like any other
37

sector in the economy, faces prices for factors and output both in domestic and foreign
markets and is subject to limitations of investable funds and absorptive capacity
constraints. The model characterizes the depletion path subject to constraints and
structure of a market economy. Some constraints or parameters of the model have a
notable effect on the depletion path and need to be discussed.
The present general equilibrium model assumes that the cost of extraction is
negatively related to the stock size, i.e., the extraction costs increase as deeper and
thinner layers of the resource are extracted. The depletion effect, therefore, is captured
on the cost side. Hence, the notion of economic rent captured in the model is Ricardian
rent, which is quite different from the Hotelling rent.25 Ricardian rent is defined as the

market price of the resource net of production cost, where non-resource factors of
production (physical capital and labor) are valued at market rates. As Hotelling rent is
associated with exhaustibility, Ricardian rent is associated with resources that occur in a
varying quality. An interpretation of the assumption of increasing extraction costs is that
the resource occurs in layers of different quality and superior quality, i.e., lower costs
deposits, are extracted first.
The assumption of fixed foreign savings rules out investing in foreign assets and
borrowing to expand domestic production capacity. This assumption, along with
diminishing efficiency of investment, has direct bearing on oil production by reducing
capital utilization in the sector. These constraints are realistic and clearly distinguish the
general equilibrium approach from the control theory framework of conventional partial
equilibrium models of exhaustible resources. In control models, production factors are
perfectly mobile and can be instantaneously employed at market prices in unlimited
quantities.
The government follows a development strategy that emphasizes investment in
the domestic economy without borrowing or investing abroad. The government
determines how much to invest in the oil sector. The expansion of production in the oil
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sector, however, is subject to diminishing efficiency of investment, which reflects various
bottlenecks such as shortages of technical knowledge or skilled labor.
The terminal conditions play a decisive role in the outcome of any finite-horizon
optimization model. The optimization literature, however, provides no clear suggestion
other than that the resulting time paths must be reasonable. Experiment 1 below
describes the effects of terminal conditions on the optimal depletion path. The other
parameters and model assumptions that have a significant effect on the depletion path are
the discount rate and the assumption of constant world prices. Discounting has important
implications for inter-generational equity and directly affects the optimal depletion path.
Experiment 2 examines the sensitivity of the model outcome to variation in the discount
rate. The assumption of constant world prices has clear implications for the depletion
path. For example, with expectations of a higher future price the government would
adjust its production policy to reap future benefits. Our assumption of a constant real
world price of oil, however, is not far removed from experience.
Experiment 1. Effects of Resource Valuation on Optimal Depletion

The terminal conditions in this model consist of a valuation of total physical
capital stock and a valuation of unexploited resource left in the ground. Choosing
various salvage values for capital and resource at the terminal period generates
alternative paths for the economy. Figure 4 shows the depletion paths when the salvage
values of both types of capital are increased 5% or decreased 5% and 50%.
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Figure 4. Effects of Various Valuation of Terminal Capital Stock
and Resource on Depletion Path

In addition to effects of changes in the salvage value of physical and natural
capital, the relative valuation of the two types of capital also has a significant impact on
the depletion path. In this part of the experiment we keep the salvage value of physical
capital constant (at its base run value) and vary the salvage value of the resource. We ask
what depletion path would result if the salvage value of the resource were twice (four
times) higher than the physical capital and vice versa. As Figure 5 shows, the relative
valuation of these two types of capital has important impact on the depletion path. For
example, the experiment shows that if the salvage value of the resource were four times
greater than physical capital, we would basically have the same level of extraction as that
of the base year. On the other hand if the salvage value of the resource is only one fourth
that of capital, we would tend to deplete the resource rapidly. This result is significant in
that it reveals that the rate at which a country decides to deplete its exhaustible resource
greatly depends on its relative valuation of man-made and natural capital. Intuitively,
this says that if a resource-based economy perceives the physical capital to be more
valuable than the resource, everything else being constant, it would tend to deplete its
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resource at a faster rate. The general tendency in oil economies to convert nonrenewable resource to reproducible capital as fast as possible reflects the perception that
they can do better with man-made capital than natural resource.
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Figure 5. Effects of Change in the Relative Terminal Period
Valuation of Capital and Resource on Depletion Path

Experiment 2. Effects of Discount Rate

Variation in the discount rate has profound implications for inter-generational
equity. The ethical and welfare issues raised by discounting have been debated by
economists for a long time with no clear resolution.26 There seems to be some agreement,
however, that in general the social discount rate is below the private discount rate. In
particular, when a natural resource is owned publicly, the government is expected to
manage with a greater consideration for inter-generational equity. The partial
equilibrium models of exhaustible resources have demonstrated that the higher the
discount rate, the greater is the tendency to consume by the current generation. To study
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the effect of the discount rate on the depletion profile, we conducted a simulation
experiment doubling the discount rate.
Figure 6 shows the extraction level for the base case, with a discount rate of 5%,
as well as for the case with a discount rate of 8%. Similar to results from partial
equilibrium models, generally, the depletion takes place faster under the higher discount
rate. A higher discount rate encourages more current consumption and reflects a lower
valuation for the resource left in the ground for the future, therefore, the depletion takes
place at a faster rate.
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Figure 6. Oil Production Under Two
Different Discount Rates

6- Conclusions

This paper presented a dynamic CGE model designed to investigate fundamental
questions that oil exporting developing countries must address. Combining elements
from exhaustible resources and computable general equilibrium literatures we

42

constructed a dynamic multisectoral optimization model of the Iranian economy. The
model addressed the questions of optimal depletion, optimal savings, and investment
allocation in a general equilibrium framework. A general equilibrium approach, in this
instance, is superior to a conventional partial equilibrium approach because it captures
economy-wide effects. In particular, our computable general equilibrium model takes
into account:
- constraints implied by a market economy;
- imperfect substitution in foreign trade;
- imperfections in capital markets such as diminishing marginal efficiency of
investment, heterogeneous sector specific capital, and time lags in investment
gestation; and
- inter-sectoral interactions.
The results of simulation experiments show that:
1- The relative valuation of resource and physical capital has significant effect on
resource depletion. A country that imputes a higher value to physical capital
would extract its resource more rapidly. This valuation is subjective and may be
based on a perception that, for example, the country can derive more benefits
from physical capital than a theoretically equivalent quantity of natural capital.
2- Similar to results from partial equilibrium models of exhaustible resource, the
model shows that higher discount rates encourage more rapid depletion.
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Endnotes
1

See Devarajan (1988) for a brief discussion and references.

2

We use the word 'depletion' interchangeably with the word 'extraction' and not as a reference to
complete exhaustion of a resource.

3

Among CGE models applied to energy issues in developed countries include Jorgensen (1982),
Jorgensen and Wilcoxen (1990), Bergman 1988 and 1990.

4

There are a few CGE models of developing countries that include financial side of the economy
by including assets and asset markets. For a discussion of this group of "financial" CGE models
see Robinson (1991); for examples of these models see Rosenweig and Taylor (1990),
Bourguignon, Branson, and de Melo (1991), and Lewis (1992).

5

The focus of the model is on labor abundant oil exporting countries which have large enough
and diversified domestic ecnomoy not to consider investing abroad. The issues regarding capital
flows, however, can easily be incorported in the model.
6

A strand of neoclassical political economy concerned with development economics holds that
the state intervention in the economy, as in imposing physical quantitative controls over imports
or licensing investment in capacity creation and expansion, often results in rent seeking activities
where resources are diverted from production to socially wasteful activities (see for example
Kruger, 1974 and Bhagwati J. 1982). Here we are not concerned with these issues and retain the
view that has been dominant in development economics.

7

The common practice in CGE literature is that the level of government expenditure is either
exogenously given, as in Jorgenson and Yun (1986), and Zonnoor (1983), or endogenously
determined by the balanced budget conditions, as in Benjamin et al. (1989), and Lewis (1992).

8

Because of its insignificant role, quite often, labor is left out of oil sector's production function;
see for example the Egypt model of Martin et al. (1986).

9

Pereira and Shoven (1988) suggest one reason for slow adoption of production-side dynamics
is the scarcity of accepted theories regarding the dynamic behavior of firms.

10

In resource economics literature economic rent (or simply rent) appears under a number of
different names including: shadow price of resource, user cost, royalty, opportunity cost (of using
a unit of resource today), net price and marginal profit. In essence all these names refer to the
difference between price and marginal cost of producing an exhaustible resource. For a concise
note on the historical background to rent on exhaustible resources see Hartwick(1989), appendix I
pp 129-137.

11

The modern treatment of the economics of exhaustible resources is due to the pioneering
works of Gray(1914) and Hotelling(1931). For a brief account of the contributions of Hotelling
to this field of economics see Devarajan, Fisher (1981). For comprehensive surveys of the
literature see Peterson and Fisher (1977), Fisher (1981), and Hartwick (1989).
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12

Deverajan(1981) identifies two distinct perspectives on natural resources dating as far back as
Malthus(1826) and Ricardo(1817). The Malthusian view holds that the resource is in constant
quality hence the extraction costs are constant (independent of the stock) as it is assumed in
Hotelling's model. The Ricardians, on the other hand, underline the fact that resources occur in
varying grades thus higher quality ores get depleted first and lower qualities impose higher
extraction costs. Both perspectives of course agree on the existence of a limit on the availability
of resources.

13

A number of studies that have rigorously extended Hotelling's results to the case of optimal
depletion of deposits of varying qualities include: Herfindahl(1967), Heal(1976), Solow and
Frederic Y. Wan(1976), and Hartwick(1978).

14

Fisher(1981) provides an informal discussion of various kinds of uncertainty and summarizes
the effects of uncertainty and exploration on the time paths of the output and price of an
exhaustible resource. Pindyck(1978) presents a model of optimal exploration and production of a
resource; Deverajan(1981), Deverajan and Fisher(1982) present a model of uncertain exploration
and show that unobservable resource rent is linked to marginal exploration cost which is
observable.

15

A full discussion of the derivation and interpretation of these conditions can be found in
Schluze (1974), Pindyck (1978), or Fisher (1981).

16

See Varian(1984) pp 28-9.

17

For a full explanation and limitations of this approach to modeling the investment allocation
see Dervis, et al (1982). For an intertemporal forward looking investment behavior specification
see Deverajan, and Go (1998).

18

This is a simplified form of the absorptive capacity function used in Kendrick (1990).

19

For a later exposition and refinement of this class of CGE models see Devarajan, Lewis and
Robinson (1991).

20

The idea of CET specification is due to Powell and Gruen (1968). The idea of product
differentiation between domestic output and exports is very common in CGE models of
developing countries.

21

This means that the economy is stationary within the duration of 2 years and dynamic
equations are updated from one period to the next and not annually.

22

The last periods in numerical optimization models are often not counted because of abrupt
change in some endogenous variables at the terminal period. For example, in our model marginal
propensity to save falls to its lower bound at terminal period since there is no need to save
anymore.

23

There is no objective way to determine whether man-made capital or natural capital
contributes more to the welfare at a given point in time. In our base run we assume that
contribution to the welfare of one barrel of oil is equivalent to that of one thousand units of
physical capital. The market value of a barrel of oil at the base year is equivalent to the market
value of more than two thousand units of physical capital. The shadow prices of capital and
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resource at the base year, however, depending on the initial assumptions about the terminal
conditions, indicate much lower valuation for a barrel of oil than that implied by the market
valuation.
24

Conventional partial equilibrium models of exhaustible resources assume complete exhaustion
by terminal period. See Levhari and Liviatan (1977) for a full discussion of the implications of
assuming complete and incomplete exhaustion.

25

A classic result of the theory of exhaustible resources, due to Hotelling, is that along an
optimal path the present value of the net price of a resource is constant across periods. In other
words, the owner of the resource is indifferent between extracting today and earning a market
interest rate on the proceeds or leaving the resource in the ground and selling the following
period. This result may be equivalently stated as the famous "r percent rule" which says that the
current valued marginal profit of extracting a resource increases over time at rate of interest. This
equilibrium rise in the unit price of an exhaustible resource is also known as the Hotelling rent.
In the general equilibrium context the domestic price of oil is determined by world prices, trade
elasticities, and equilibrium conditions.

26

For a brief account of debate on whether or not to discount and on the appropriate level see
Fisher (1981) PP 68-74.
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